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The Immunity of Foreign Subsidiaries
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act

Melissa Lang* and Richard Balest

INTRODUCTION
A train derails, killing hundreds of people. Representatives
of the decedents sue the train company in state court after finding that the accident was a result of a defective part in the
brakes. The train company removes to federal court and impleads both the brake manufacturer, a foreign company indirectly owned by a foreign government, and the brake manufacturer's subsidiaries, which manufactured the defective part.
Can the train company proceed with its impleader action
against the brake manufacturer's subsidiaries? Is the brake
manufacturer's subsidiary immune from litigation under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)? The FSIA provides
the exclusive means by which a federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state and its instrumentalities.' The FSIA provides that "[a]ny civil action brought in
State court against a foreign state ...may be removed by the
foreign state to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending." 2 Whether the foreign company would be afforded immunity by the FSIA depends on whether the company is consid* Melissa Lang received her B.A. in History from the University of Cincinnati in
2001, and anticipates receiving her J.D. from Northern Kentucky University,
Salmon P. Chase College of Law, in Spring 2004.
t Richard Bales is a Professor of Law at Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P.
Chase College of Law.
1. EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322 F.3d 635
(9th Cir. 2003); Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
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ered an "agency or instrumentality" because the company is
owned by a foreign government.
Prior to 2003, the circuits were split as to whether the FSIA
confers federal subject matter jurisdiction on the lower tiers of a
multi-tiered subsidiary which is majority owned by a foreign
state or its political subdivision, or whether federal jurisdiction
should be limited to first-tier subsidiaries. 3 The Ninth Circuit,
for example, refused to presume that all levels of a corporation,
which are majority owned by a foreign state, enjoy immunity
from suit under the FSIA. 4 Instead, the court held that the
FSIA grants immunity only to a foreign corporation which is directly owned by a foreign state. 5 This approach is called the "direct ownership" approach. The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, held that the FSIA grants immunity to foreign corporations which are both directly and indirectly owned by a foreign
state. 6 This approach is called the "multi-tier subsidiary" approach.
To illustrate the different outcomes produced by the two
approaches, assume that the brake manufacturer in the hypothetical is a corporation that is 75% owned by a foreign government. Both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits agreed that the
FSIA would confer federal subject matter jurisdiction on the
brake manufacturer (and require dismissal of any suit filed
against it) because it is majority owned by the foreign state.
However, if the brake manufacturer in turn owns 60% of the
shares of the subsidiary which manufactured the defective part,
the Ninth Circuit would not have upheld jurisdiction (and would
not require dismissal) over the subsidiary, whereas the Seventh
Circuit would. This is because the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
FSIA's definition of an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign
state as not including the lower tiers of a multi-tiered corporation. 7 Because the Ninth Circuit did not consider lower tiers to
be agencies or instrumentalities, the court did not extend immunity beyond the first tier of the corporation.8 The Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, did not limit immunity to the first
tier, but rather extended it to all tiers of the corporation. 9
3.
4.
5.
6.
932 (7th
7.
8.
9.

See, e.g., Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
See id.
Id.
See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
Cir. 1996).
See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1461-62.
Id. at 1462.
Air Crash DisasterNear Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 941.
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In April 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the circuit
split in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.10 This decision adopted the
Ninth Circuit approach and held that only direct ownership of a
majority of a company's shares by a foreign state qualifies that
company for immunity.1 1 To illustrate, if the recent Supreme
Court ruling were applied in the train derailment hypothetical,
only the brake manufacturer would be entitled to sovereign immunity. The brake manufacturer's subsidiary, on the other
hand, would still be subject to suit in both state and federal
court.
While the Dole Court resolved the split in authority between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Court did not consider a third approach to the issue. Prior to Dole, Judge Kaplan
of the Southern District of New York suggested a "beneficial interest" approach to determine whether a lower-tier subsidiary of
a foreign government-owned corporation should be allowed protection under the FSIA. 12 The beneficial interest approach
would grant immunity only if the foreign state's interest in its
subsidiary exceeds 50%.13 Thus, the beneficial interest approach advances Congressional intent by ensuring that immunity will only be granted where the foreign state holds a sub14
stantial interest in a company.
This Article argues that Congress should legislatively overrule the Dole decision and adopt the beneficial interest test for
determining whether a corporation should enjoy federal subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Part I of this Article explains the purpose of the FSIA and describes its significance
concerning litigation with a corporation which could potentially
be granted immunity by the Act. Part II describes the pre-Dole
circuit split as well as the beneficial interest approach proposed
by Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York. Part III
discusses the Supreme Court's Dole decision, in which the Court
held that the FSIA confers sovereign immunity upon a foreign
company which is directly owned by a foreign government. Part
IV analyzes the various approaches of determining foreign sovereign immunity.

10. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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This Article proposes that the courts use a beneficial interest test. This test is consistent with the statutory language and
legislative intent of the FSIA. It promotes U.S. foreign policy by
ensuring that immunity is extended to--but only to-a corporation in which a foreign nation owns a substantial interest in the
corporation. It provides a bright-line, quantifiable rule which
courts can use to determine whether a foreign defendant corporation should be granted immunity from suit in U.S. courts. For
these reasons, this Article concludes that Congress should enact
the beneficial interest test for determining the foreign sovereign
immunity of corporations.
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was enacted
to determine whether a foreign state-owned corporation sued in
U.S. courts by a domestic plaintiff should be granted immunity. 15 Historically, all foreign states were granted absolute sovereign immunity from suit in U.S. courts. 16 However, starting
17
in the mid-1900s, U.S. views on immunity began to change.
The practices ranged from absolute immunity to a theory of restrictive immunity, which was finally codified in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.18 An overview of this progression is
discussed below.
A. THE ABSOLUTE THEORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Originally, it was the job of the State Department to make
formal suggestions to the courts to aid in determining whether a
foreign state should enjoy immunity from suit in U.S. courts. 19
These decisions were made pursuant to recommendations made
by the Executive Branch. 20 Until 1952, the State Department
requested absolute immunity to all nations which were friendly

15. Andrew Loewenstein, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Corporate
Subsidies or Instrumentalitiesof Foreign States, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 350 (2001).
16. Jane H. Griggs, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Do Tiered
Corporate SubsidiariesConstitute ForeignStates?, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 389
(1998).
17. Id. at 394-95.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2000).
19. Clinton L. Narver, Putting the "Sovereign" Back in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or Instrumentality
Status, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 168 (2001).
20. Id.
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with the United States. 2 1 Eventually this process became more
political than legal because the Executive Branch was under
pressure from foreign states. 22 Oftentimes immunity was
granted due to political considerations in situations where immunity would not normally have been extended. 23 However,
when a foreign state failed to ask the State Department for immunity, the courts were required to make the ultimate decision
to grant or withhold immunity. 24 Because immunity could be
decided either by the Executive or Judicial Branch, and as a result of the lack of a clear standard which each branch should follow in making its determination, decisions were inconsistent. 25
This confusion began to fester when the Supreme Court established the theory of absolute immunity for foreign states in
its 1812, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.26 The Court determined that U.S. courts could not exercise jurisdiction over a
French sailing vessel found in U.S. waters. 27 Lower federal
courts read this opinion to mean that foreign states were entitled to an absolute immunity over their public governmental
acts as well as their commercial activities. 28 Over one hundred
years later the Court reaffirmed its decision to confer absolute
immunity on foreign states in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro.29 In
this case, the Supreme Court found that an Italian ship, which
carried both passengers and cargo, was immune from suit in
U.S. courts. 30 Thus, the Court established a theory of absolute

immunity concerning a foreign state's public activities to which
courts would adhere for 140 years. 31
B. THE THEORY OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY

During the first half of the twentieth century, legal commentators began to notice that a theory of restrictive immunity

21. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
22. Id. at 487.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 488.
26. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
27. Id. at 125.
28. Narver, supra note 19, at 167.
29. 13 F.2d 468 (D.N.Y. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
30. 271 U.S. at 576.
31. Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Right to a Jury Trial in
Suits Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 159,
164 (1996).
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was becoming increasingly prevalent internationally. 32 American commentators began to advocate for a more restrictive theory of immunity, which limited immunity to the public acts of
foreign sovereigns. 33 Under this theory, the private and com34
mercial activities of a foreign sovereign were not protected.
In a famed 1952 letter Jack Tate, Legal Advisor to the State
Department, announced to the American judiciary that the
United States would formally adopt a restrictive theory of immunity.3 5 This theory granted immunity for a nation's public
acts, but did not extend immunity to private acts. 36 In support
of the decision to adopt the new theory, Tate cited reasons such
as the growing international reliance on a restrictive theory of
immunity, as well as increasing U.S. involvement in interna37
tional trade.
Although the State Department strove to adhere to this new
policy, determinations were still frequently made on a political,
rather than legal basis. 38 This often resulted in inconsistent determinations of immunity. 39 For example, in Victory Transport,
40
Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteccimientos y Transportes,
the Second Circuit, noting that the State Department had not
commented on immunity, denied immunity on a contract for the
transport of grain because the transport of grain was not a public act; however, in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,41 the Second Circuit, noting that the State Department had
"suggested" that immunity was appropriate, granted immunity
on a contract dispute for the transport of grain.
Courts also had trouble developing a bright line rule which
would distinguish between the public and commercial, or private, activities of a foreign state. 42 For example, in Mexico v.
Hoffman, 43 the Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to a
sailing vessel owned by, but not in the possession of, the Mexi32. Narver, supra note 19, at 168.
33. Id. at 169.
34. Id.
35. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department
of State, to Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976).
36. Id.
37. Id; see also Narver, supra note 19, at 169.
38. Narver, supra note 19, at 169.
39. Id.
40. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
41. 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. See Abir, supranote 31, at 164.
43. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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can government. 4 4 The Court justified this decision by stating:
Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction over the
vessel of a foreign government has its effect upon our relations with
that government. Hence it is a guiding principle in determining

whether a court should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such
cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive
arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the action of the political branch, and
will 45
not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

In an effort to eliminate the confusion, Congress enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976.46
C. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
Congress enacted the FSIA in an attempt to remedy the
problems discussed above. It designed the FSIA to alleviate the
pressure placed on the State Department in making decisions
regarding whether a foreign defendant is immune from litiga47
tion in U.S. courts by shifting the burden to the judiciary.
Similarly, Congress intended that the FSIA, through its definition of "foreign state," would establish standards for determining immunity, thus promoting uniformity in cases involving for48
eign governments.
The FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 49 It is the sole means by which a federal court may establish jurisdiction over a foreign state, 50 and is triggered when a
U.S. plaintiff files suit in a U.S. court against a foreign state, or
51
a foreign state-owned corporation.
The immunity clause of the FSIA provides that "...
a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the States .... ."52 Section 1603 of the
Act provides that the term "foreign state"
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state .... An agency or instrumentality of a
44.
45.

See id.
See id. at 35 (internal citations omitted).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
47. Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 355-56.
48. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
49. Id.; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
50. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428. 424-49,
455 (1989).
51. See generally Abir, supra note 31.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
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foreign state" means any entity (1) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of5 3the United States... nor
created under the laws of any third country.

Once the foreign defendant establishes a prima facie case
that it is a "foreign state" as defined by the Act, it is permitted
to remove the action to federal court pursuant to the FSIA.54 If
found to be a "foreign state" under the Act, and not subject to
one of the exceptions set forth in § 1605,55 the defendant is im56
mune from suit, and the action is dismissed.
Section 1605 contains several exceptions to the general
grant of immunity. This Section withholds immunity, for example, if the foreign state has waived immunity or if the suit is
based on commercial activity within the United States conducted by the foreign state. The withholding of immunity does
not mean, however, that the foreign state is subject to suit in
the United States in the same way as other defendants; instead,
the FSIA entitles the foreign state to a bench trial.5 7 The bench
53.
54.
55.

28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
The FSIA provides:

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity...,
(2) ... the action is based upon commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state...;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property. . . is present in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state...;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession
or gifts or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are
in issue; (5) ...money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property...
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by
the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties ...;
(7) ...in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking.
28 U.S.C. § 1605
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
57. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468
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trial constitutes a further attempt to establish uniformity in
proceedings against "foreign state" defendants, and advances
this goal in two ways. 58 First, the court's decision rests entirely
upon the judge, instead of a jury decision whose findings may be
inconsistent with other juries presented with similar cases.
Second, subjecting a foreign defendant to a trial by jury would
not promote uniformity in decisions because the defendant
would be subject to potentially adverse biases held by members
of the jury. 59 For these reasons, the FSIA confers immunity on
a foreign state; or, when an exception to the immunity applies,
provides a foreign state with the right to a non-jury trial in fed60
eral court.
Typically, however, if the defendant is not immune from
suit under the FSIA, it will move to dismiss on a theory of forum
non conveniens.61 This doctrine authorizes a trial court to deny
venue, even though the court has jurisdiction, when the court
believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly
tried in a court in another forum. 62 If the motion is granted, the
suit will be dismissed, and short of bringing the action in another country, the plaintiffs will not have any remedy.
Consequently, under the FSIA, a suit may be dismissed before the parties are even able to begin discovery. 63 In this event,
an injured party may have no means of recovery against a foreign-owned company, particularly if it is impractical for the
plaintiff to bring the suit in the defendant's country. The FSIA,
however, was only enacted to provide a framework upon which
courts can rely to determine immunity.64 The American public's
interest in avenging a wrong committed upon a particular plaintiff was not considered when the Act was drafted. 65 Instead, by
enacting the FSIA, Congress sought to create a standard which

(2003) (Nos. 01-593, 01-594).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
59. Narver, supra note 19, at 171.
60. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus. on Nov. 11, 2000, 198 F. Supp. 2d 420,
424 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
61. See, e.g., Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Minde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz
of Ukr., 158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the FSIA does not
limit the authority of federal courts to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens).
62. Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Kelly v. Syria Shell Petrol. Develop. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th Cir.
2000) (affirming district court's denial of stay pending discovery and grant of motion
to dismiss under FSIA).
64. See Loewenstein, supranote 15, at 356.
65. Id.
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would allow the Executive branch to conduct successful, and
consistent, foreign policy. 66 Because it is not in the best interest

of foreign policy to allow frivolous suits against foreign governments and government-owned corporations, it is best to satisfy
potential plaintiffs by providing a consistent determination of
when corporations will be protected under the FSIA.
Although the FSIA aims to provide a bright-line rule for the
application of sovereign immunity, it fails because the language
is ambiguous. The Act effectively gives immunity to a "foreign
state." However, the definition of "foreign state" is ambiguous.
The FSIA defines "foreign state" as "includ[ing] a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state."67 The ambiguity lies in whether an "agency or

instrumentality" is a foreign state or whether an "agency or instrumentality" is merely included in, or part of, a foreign state.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,68 the circuits were split over this very issue.
II. THE PRE-DOLE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although the FSIA was enacted to provide a standard
which could be relied upon when determining sovereign immunity, the courts are inconsistent in their interpretations of the
Act. 69 A uniform interpretation of the FSIA is important because it will effectuate Congress' intent to ensure consistent foreign policy. 70 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits created the split
when they reached differing interpretations of the ambiguous
wording of the FSIA. In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,71 the Ninth
Circuit limited sovereign immunity to the first tier of a multitiered corporation which is majority owned by a foreign government. However, in 1996, one year after the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gates, the Seventh Circuit extended immunity to the
lower tiers of a multi-tiered government-owned corporation in In
re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31,
1994.72 An analysis of both approaches follows.
66. Id. The enactment of the FSIA was not intended to prohibit the State Department from asserting sovereign immunity for heads of state on behalf of the
President. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
68. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
69. See infra Part JII.A-C.
70. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
71. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
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A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ONLY PROTECTS THE FIRST TIER OF A
CORPORATION
Until the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Gates v. Victor
Fine Foods,73 courts presumed that all levels of a multi-tiered
corporation owned by a foreign state fell under the classification
of "foreign state" for purposes of the FSIA; in such cases, federal
courts would invoke subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss the
case. 74 However in Gates, a landmark decision, the Ninth Circuit found that an indirectly-owned subsidiary of a "foreign
state" was not itself a "foreign state," and therefore was not af75
forded immunity under the FSIA.
The Alberta Pork Producers Development Corporation (Alberta Pork) was established pursuant to a Canadian statute 76 to
facilitate the marketing and promotion of hogs raised in Alberta,
Canada. 77 Alberta Pork acquired Fletcher Fine Foods (FFF),
which was parent to Golden Gate Fresh Foods (GGFF), a California pork processing plant, operating under the name Victor
Fine Foods. 78 GGFF provided a welfare benefit plan to its employees. 79 When the company closed without notice of its decision to discontinue the welfare benefits plan, the employees filed
a class action against GGFF, Alberta Pork, and FFF alleging a
violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act 8 O and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1985.81 Alberta Pork and FFF moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA.82 There was
no dispute as to whether Alberta Pork met the first two elements under the FSIA to be considered an agency or instrumentality of the Province of Alberta.8 3 The problem arose in determining whether FFF was similarly protected from suit by the
FSIA as an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision, or
84
majority owned by a foreign state or its political subdivision.

73. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1457.
74. See generally Griggs, supra note 16.
75. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1457.
76. The Alberta Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, 10 Rev. Stats. of Alberta [R.S.A.], Ch. M-5.1 (1980).
77. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1461.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 2101.
81.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168.

82.
83.
84.

Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1460.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that FFF was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, and advanced four reasons why
FFF was not protected under the FSIA.85 First, the court looked

to the language of the statute to determine whether an "agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state" was itself a "foreign
state."8

6

Second, the court analyzed the Congressional Record,

and found that Congress did not intend "agency or instrumentality" to be synonymous with "foreign state."8

7

Third, the court

found that if Congress had intended to allow successive tiering
of a corporation, it would have expressly done so. 8 8 Fourth, the
court concluded that FFF could only be an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" if the majority of its shares was directly owned by a foreign state.8 9
The Ninth Circuit first reasoned that a close reading of the
statutory language implies that an "agency or instrumentality"
was not itself a "foreign state" for purposes of the Act. 90 The
statute provides that a foreign state "includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."91 The Gates court theorized that the word "includes"
does not equate an "agency or instrumentality" with a foreign
state. 92 Instead, the "agency or instrumentality" enjoys the protection bestowed upon a foreign state under the FSIA, but is not
itself a foreign state. 93 Further, an "agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state" is "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof."94 In combining both definitions, a strict statutory interpretation would not allow successive tiering of a corporation
because the "agency or instrumentality" must be owned by the
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or the foreign
state must hold a majority interest in the corporation. 95 Thus,
according to the Ninth Circuit, FFF was not an "agency or instrumentality" because it is not directly owned by a foreign state

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 1462.
Id.
Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
Id. at 1461-62.
See id. at 1461.
28 U.S.C. § 1603.
See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
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or a political subdivision thereof. 96 Rather, FFF was owned by
an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."
The Ninth Circuit's second argument was that a strict interpretation of the Act suggests that Congress did not intend
"agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state" to be synonymous with "foreign state."97 The remainder of the statute takes

great care to differentiate between the two. 98 For example, the
House Report states:
Where ownership is divided between a foreign state and private interests, the entity will be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of
stock or otherwise) is9 9owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state's
political subdivision.

If Congress had intended that "foreign state" was the same
as "agency or instrumentality," then it would also have intended
to equate "foreign state" with "political subdivision." 100 The
Ninth Circuit found, however, that this was highly unlikely for
two reasons. First, if "political subdivision" is synonymous with
"foreign state" then there was no need to mention "political subdivision." 10 1 However, the literal meaning of "political subdivision" implies that it is a part of a larger body. 10 2 This larger
body referred to in the definition of "political subdivision" is a
"foreign state," as it is logical that a "foreign state" would have a
"political subdivision."'1 3 Thus, just as a "political subdivision"
is not the same as a "foreign state," an "agency or instrumentality" is also not synonymous with "foreign state."' 04
This rationale led the court to hold that in order for an entity to enjoy immunity under the FSIA, a "foreign state" must
directly own a majority of its shares. 0 5 By definition, an
"agency or instrumentality" must be majority owned by a "foreign state." An "agency or instrumentality" cannot, itself, be a
"foreign state." 10 6 Thus, a wholly-owned subsidiary of an

96.

Id. at 1462-63.

97. Id. at 1462.
98. Id.
99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6604,
6614 (emphasis added).
100. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.

101.

Id.

102.

Id.

103.
104.

Id.
Id.

105.
106.

Id. at 1461-62.
Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
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"agency or instrumentality," which is not itself a "foreign state"
is not immune from suit in U.S. courts because it is not an
"agency or instrumentality" of that state. 0 7 Accordingly, a second-tier subsidiary which is owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is not protected under the FSIA because
it is not itself an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,"
but a subsidiary of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
8
state."10
The Ninth Circuit's third argument for holding that FFF
was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state was
based on Congressional intent. The court reasoned that, had
Congress intended to allow successive tiering of a corporation in
order to invoke the immunities in the FSIA, Congress could
have expressly done so in the Act. 109 Thus, to read the Act differently would provide blanket immunity for all corporations
that are partially owned by a foreign state, or a subdivision
thereof, regardless of how far down the chain of ownership the
entity may fall. The court was reluctant to confer such a broad
view of sovereign immunity when the court could not find this
intent in the language itself.110
The Ninth Circuit's fourth argument for holding that FFF
was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state was
based on Alberta's ownership interest in FFF.111 The court analyzed the company's direct ownership to determine whether FFF
was an agency or instrumentality of Canada. 1 2 FFF could only
be an "agency or instrumentality" if the majority of its shares
were owned by "a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof." 113 Because Alberta Pork owned 100% of FFF's shares,
and Alberta Pork was deemed an "agency or instrumentality" of
the province of Alberta, FFF was not owned by a "foreign state,"
and therefore was not awarded immunity under the FSIA.114
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a wholly-owned subsidiary of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is not itself a foreign state, and therefore is not afforded protection under the FSIA.n5
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
Id.
Id. at 1462-63.
Id.
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For example, the Ninth Circuit noted that Congress intended the terms "organ" and "agency or instrumentality" to be
broadly construed. 116 The court cited to language in the legislative record which spoke about the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 117 A House report noted:
entities which meet the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state" could assume a variety of forms, including a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as
a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export
association, a governmental procurement agency or a11department
or
8
ministry which acts and is suable [sic] in its own name.

The court further noticed that Congress was careful to distinguish between foreign states, political subdivisions, and
agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states and political subdivisions. 119 Had Congress intended "agency or instrumentality" to be synonymous with "foreign state," it could have easily
drafted the language to read that an entity must be owned by a
foreign state, political subdivision, or agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state or political subdivision. Additionally, the court
feared that the opposite reading, such as that subscribed to by
the Seventh Circuit, would expand the immunity beyond Congress' intent because it would allow an endless chain of "nth"12
tier subsidiaries to claim immunity under the FSIA. 0
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PROTECTS LOWER TIERS OF A
CORPORATION

The Seventh Circuit, joined by the Fifth 121 and Sixth 122 Circuits, found that an "agency or instrumentality," by virtue of its
status as a "foreign state," would enjoy immunity under the
FSIA unless it falls into one of the exceptions defined in 28
U.S.C. § 1605.123 Thus, where a second-tier subsidiary which is
majority owned by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" is also an "agency or instrumentality" of the foreign state,
116.

Id. at 1460.

117. Id.
118. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6614.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
1983).

Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
Id.
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 182 (5th Cir. 2000).
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 1988).
Alberti v. Empressa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.
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that subsidiary is subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction
under the FSIA. 124
This principle was explained in In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994.125 There, Ameri-

can Eagle flight 4184 developed icing problems and crashed,
killing sixty-eight passengers. 126 The victims' families filed a
wrongful death claim against Avions de Transport Regional,
127
G.I.E. (ATR), the company which manufactured the airplane.
ATR was indirectly owned by the French and Italian governments. 128 Because ATR was either named as a defendant or a
third party defendant in all of the suits, ATR sought to remove
the case to federal court pursuant to the FSIA.129
The plaintiffs argued that ATR did not qualify as a "foreign
state" and therefore the suit was not removable to federal
court. 130

To determine whether ATR was subject to immunity

under the FSIA, the district court analyzed the ownership structure.' 3 1 ATR was created in 1982 as a joint venture by the Italian and French governments, and was ultimately established
under French law. 132 Aerospatiale, Societe Nationale Industrielle, S.A. (SNIA) was the French national aerospace company. 133 The French government owned 91.42% of SNIA.134
Alenia was a subdivision of Finmeccanica SpA, which was
62.14% owned by the Italian Instituto Per La Riconstruzione
(IRI). 135 IRI was a holding company which was 100% owned by
the Italian government. 136 Thus, the French and Italian governments indirectly owned 75% of ATR. 137

124. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind.on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
941 (7th Cir. 1996).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 935.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 936.
129. Id.
130. Air Crash DisasterNear Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 936.
131. Id. at 935.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 936 (stating that 62.16% was owned directly by the French government and 20% through a company named Sogepa and "Credit Lyonnais Industria
own[ed] the remaining 17.81%, which [was] owned by Credit Lyonnais, 52% of which
[in turn was] owned by the French government").
135. Id. at 935-36.
136. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 935-36.
137. Id.
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The court extended immunity under the FSIA because ATR
138
was indirectly owned by the French and Italian governments.
In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked to the language of the statute. 139 The court found that Congress intended
the FSIA to include entities other than the actual foreign state,
as evidenced by the Congressional House Reports that stated,
"entities which meet the definition of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a variety of forms,140
including..., a transport organization such as a[n] ... airline."'

The Seventh Circuit also noted that Congress intended the
FSIA to protect foreign governments, as well as separately incorporated entities such as airlines or shipping lines in concluding that the FSIA extended immunity to entities other than foreign governments. 14 1 The Seventh Circuit cited to language in
the Congressional Record that said agencies or instrumentalities could assume "a variety of forms" including "a transport organization such as an airline."'142 For example, the court centered the majority of its argument around Congress' use of an
airline as an example of an entity that might be covered by the
FSIA. 143 Thus, the court interpreted this language as granting
immunity to entities that are directly owned by a foreign state
144
or political subdivision of a foreign state.
Second, because ATR was owned by two separate governments, the court had to decide whether governments could
"pool" their interests to create a majority ownership. 145 This
was significant because each government owned roughly half of
ATR's shares. The court relied on the decisions of other jurisdictions, which reasoned that the statute did not specify that the
majority interest must be owned by one state, to determine that
146
pooling was allowed.
Third, the Court considered whether the lower tiers of a
corporation could establish foreign state status. 147 The plaintiffs
argued that ATR could not remove to federal court because although it was owned by a foreign state, its ownership was indi138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 939.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
Air Crash DisasterNear Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 936.
See generally id.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 939.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 13:2

rect. 148 Although SNIA was an instrumentality of a foreign
state, Alenia was a subsidiary of an instrumentality of a foreign
state. 149 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that § 1603(b) required that
both entities be owned directly by a foreign state. 150 To support
their argument, plaintiffs cited to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, which held that an indirectly-owned
subsidiary of a foreign state was not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA.151
Contrary to the Gates decision, the Seventh Circuit found
that the word "includes" in the Act mandated a broad definition
of "foreign state."'1 52 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit when it found that the word "includes" requires
that the phrase "agency or instrumentality" is synonymous with
"foreign state." 1-5 3 Therefore, an entity that is majority owned by
an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is synonymous
154
with an entity that is majority owned by a "foreign state."
Consequently, if a foreign state "includes" an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" then a corporation that is majority
owned by a foreign state "includes" a corporation that is owned
155
by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."
Consequently, the court held that an indirect or tiered majority ownership is sufficient to qualify an entity as a foreign
state. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit also followed this
reasoning. 156 The Sixth Circuit similarly held that a corporation
indirectly owned by a foreign state qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA.157 According to these circuits, the FSIA does not draw a distinction
between direct and indirect ownership, and therefore does not
expressly impose a requirement of direct ownership by a foreign
state upon an entity in order to acquire immunity under the
FSIA. 158

148. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 940.
153. Id. at 939.
154. Air Crash DisasterNear Roselawn, 96
155. Id.
156. See generally Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,
157. See generally Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney
Cir. 1988).
158. Id.

F.3d at 939.

F.3d at 939.
231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th
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C. THE SPLIT WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, and district courts within the circuit are split. 159 An innovative approach has emerged from the Southern District of New York.
Two recent inconsistent decisions from the Southern District of
New York suggest a possible solution to the problem.
Musopole v. South African Airways (PTY) Ltd.,160 involved

a plaintiff who claimed an employee of South African Airways,
Ltd. (SAA) harassed her when the employee refused to let her
board an airplane. 161 The plaintiff sued in New York state court
alleging tort and contract claims against SAA.16 2 SAA then re-

moved the case to the Southern District of New York, alleging
1
foreign state status under the FSIA. 63

Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York found
that SAA qualified for immunity under the FSIA because

159. Compare Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), with In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus. on Nov. 11, 2000, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 420, (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This Article will discuss only Judge Kaplan's Musopole decision in detail. It should be noted, however, that Judge Scheindlin held the
complete opposite of Judge Kaplan in In re Ski Train. In that case, plaintiffs children and grandchildren died in a ski train accident because of alleged negligent upkeep of a tunnel by the defendant. Id. at 421-22. The defendant was Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG (GBK), a ski resort operator that also owned the train and tunnel
where the decedents were killed. Id. GBK moved to have the case brought in federal court under the FSIA because it was indirectly owned by the Austrian government. Id. at 422. GBK's parent corporation was Elektrizitaeswirtschaft AG (OE
AG), an Austrian power generation and tourism conglomerate which owned 45% of
GBK. Id. The Village of Kaprun owned 33.98% of GBK. In re Ski Train, 198 F.
Supp. 2d at 422. Thus, GBK argued that when the two interests were pooled, it was
majority owned (78.98%) by the Austrian government. Id. at 423. Judge Scheindlin
disagreed because although OE AG was found to be an "agency or instrumentality"
of the Austrian government, it was not found to be a "foreign state" which could, itself, have an "agency or instrumentality" such as GBK. Id. at 426. Further, the Village of Kaprun's ownership of 33.98% of GBK's shares was not sufficient to make
GBK an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Id. at 426-27.
Judge Scheindlin relied solely on the arguments advanced by the Ninth
Circuit in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods in refusing to extend to GBK the status of
"agency or instrumentality" because GBK was not directly owned by the Austrian
government. Judge Scheindlin recognized that his decision in this case created a
split within the Southern District of New York by deciding contrary to Judge Kaplan's previous decision in Musopole. See In re Ski Train, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
Judge Scheindlin did not attempt to distinguish In re Ski Train from Musopole, but
merely stated that his statutory interpretation was "better" than the interpretation
employed by Judge Kaplan. Id.
160. See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
161. Id. at 444.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Transnet Ltd., a South African corporation controlled by South
Africa's Minister for Public Enterprises, owned 80% of SAA's
shares.164 Both parties agreed that SAA was neither a political
165
subdivision nor an organ of the South African government.
The dispute was over whether SAA was an agency or instrumentality of Transnet. 166 If so, SAA would also enjoy immunity
from suit under the FSIA.
Before arriving at this conclusion, Judge Kaplan looked to
both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits for guidance. Judge Kaplan relied heavily on the Gates decision, but nonetheless reached
the opposite conclusion. 167 The argument for allowing jurisdiction was that Transnet was, undisputedly, an agency or instrumentality of the South African government, thus a "foreign
state."'168

Because Transnet, the first-tier subsidiary, was an

"agency or instrumentality," and it owned 80% of SAA's stock,
then SAA likewise enjoyed immunity as an "agency or instru169
mentality" of the South African government.
Judge Kaplan noted that the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether this was the result Congress intended in drafting the
statute. 170 The Gates court reasoned that the statutory language provided that a foreign state "includes" an agency or in171
strumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality.
The Musopole court reasoned that, had Congress intended a
second-tier subsidiary to fall under the immunity offered by
FSIA, then it would have expressly stated so in the act by using
172
clear language.
Judge Kaplan also relied on the Seventh 173 and Ninth 74
Circuits opinions which examined parts of the Congressional
Record to determine Congress' intent. However, Judge Kaplan
was more concerned with a different section of the record. He
concluded that Congress enacted the FSIA to provide federal jurisdiction and a non-jury trial to a foreign state where the outcome of the trial might affect "the ability of the executive branch
164. Id. at 447.
165. Id.
166. Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
167. Id. at 445-46.
168. Id. at 444.
169. Id. at 447.
170. Id. at 446.
171. See supra notes 75, 85, 90-108 and accompanying text.
172. See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
173. See generally In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31,
1994, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
174. See generally Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to conduct successful foreign policy." 175 Judge Kaplan found this

to be significant, because a trial by jury might not be fair if the
members of the jury are particularly biased against a foreign defendant because of its nationality. 176 To allow the first, but not
second tier, of a foreign corporation federal jurisdiction may defeat congressional intent where the foreign government indirectly holds a majority interest in the second-tier subsidiary because the government will still be subject to the problems
involved with a jury trial if it is not immune from suit, or allowed a non-jury trial. 177 Thus, drawing the line after the first
tier is an arbitrary distinction because it would not serve Congress' intent in enacting the FSIA.
In dicta, Judge Kaplan suggested that the line might be
drawn by looking to the government's beneficial interest in a
company rather than the actual interest. 178 For example, if a
government owned 51% of the shares in a given company, and
that company owned 51% of its subsidiary, then the government's beneficial interest would only amount to 26%.179 In this
case, the second tier would not be considered an "agency or instrumentality" because the government only enjoyed approximately a one-quarter interest in the company. However, if the
court considered the percentage of actual ownership, the government would hold an actual 51% interest, and federal courts
might hold jurisdiction over the company depending on whether
the court follows the Seventh or Ninth Circuit. Judge Kaplan
declined to formulate this rule, however, because, the fact that
the South African government owned 80% of SAA's shares
through Transnet was immaterial to the analysis. 18 0 Thus,
Judge Kaplan sustained federal question jurisdiction.1 8 1
To illustrate the beneficial interest approach, assume that
Peru owns 51% of a brake manufacturer. If the brake manufacturer owns 51% of a subsidiary that manufactured a faulty part,
then Peru would indirectly own 26.01% (0.51 x 0.51) of the subsidiary.18 2 In contrast, if Bolivia owned 75% of Company C,
which in turn owned 80% of Company D, Bolivia's beneficial in175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
centage

See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
See id. Beneficial interest = (percentage of ownership of Nation A) x (perof ownership of Nation B).
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terest in Company D would be 60% (0.75 x 0.80) and the court
would grant immunity. Because Peru has less than a 50% interest in the subsidiary, allowing the subsidiary protection under the FSIA is inconsistent with Congress' intent to "ensure
that a federal forum was available where the interests of foreign
nation are involved in litigation that might affect the Executive
Branch's ability to conduct successful foreign policy."'8 3 However, Bolivia holds more than a 50% interest in Company D.
Accordingly, Bolivia holds a substantial beneficial interest in
the outcome of any litigation against Company D, and therefore
Company D will be granted immunity.
Thus, prior to Dole there was a three-way split of authority.
There were two opposing approaches advanced by the circuit
courts.18 4 In its 1995 decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the
Ninth Circuit refused to extend immunity past the first tier of a
government-owned corporation. The opposite side of the issue is
explained by the Seventh Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Indiana. The third approach, advanced by
Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York, suggested a
third approach-the beneficial interest test-to determine
whether a lower tier of a foreign-owned corporation should enjoy
immunity from litigation under the FSIA.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION, DOLE FOOD CO. V.
PATRICKSON
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case that arose
in the Ninth Circuit, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.8 5 The case
involved banana workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala
and Panama who sued the Dole Food Company in state court for
Dole's use of a pesticide known to cause, among other things,
sterility, liver damage, and miscarriages. 8 6 Dole removed the
action to federal court and impleaded two Israeli companies
(Dead Sea Companies), which had manufactured some of the
pesticides used by Dole. 8 7 The two Israeli companies moved for

183. Id.
184. Compare Gates, 54 F.3d 1457 (9 th Cir. 1995); with In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
185. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
186. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001), affid,
123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003).
187. Dole, 123 S.Ct. 1655, at 1658-59.
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dismissal pursuant to the FSIA.1 88 Following its decision in
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Dead Sea Companies were neither organs nor instrumentalities
of the state of Israel.18 9 In doing so, the court upheld its previous decision to limit immunity to wholly-owned subsidiaries of a
foreign government.1 90
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Dole could proceed with its impleader action against the Dead
Sea Companies although the State of Israel only indirectly
owned the defendant companies.1 91 The answer turned on the
interpretation of the FSIA. The issue was whether the Dead
Sea Companies were "agencies or instrumentalities" of Israel,
and therefore accorded the status of a foreign state under the
FSIA, because they were indirectly owned by the Israeli government at the time the suit was filed. If so, the companies
would be immune from suit, and the FSIA would require dismissal of the action.
The Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that a company must be directly owned by a foreign government in order
to be afforded agency or instrumentality status for purposes of
the FSIA. 92 The Court arrived at its conclusion using the statu19 3
tory text and elementary principles of corporate law.
First, the Court relied upon statutory language when it concluded that, in order to be deemed an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, a foreign government must directly own the
company. 194 The Court noted that the determination of whether
a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
depends on whether the corporation is owned by a foreign
state. 195
For example, § 1603(b)(2) refers to ownership of

188. Id. at 1659.
189. Patrickson,251 F.3d at 806-07.
190. Id.
191. The second question before the Court was "whether a corporation's instrumentality status is defined at the time of an alleged tort or other actionable wrong
or, on the other hand, at the time suit is filed." Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1658. On this issue the Court ruled that "instrumentality status is determined at the time of the
filing of the complaint." Id. at 1663. Thus, to be an "agency or instrumentality" the
company must be majority owned by a foreign government at the time the complaint
is filed. See id.
192. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1662.
193. Id. at 1659-62.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1660.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 13:2

"shares."196 Additionally, the Court noted that the words "other
ownership interest" when read together with "shares" must be
interpreted to mean ownership interests other than ownership
of stock. 19 7 Therefore, Congress intended ownership to depend
on formal corporate ownership, as opposed to ownership in a colloquial sense. 198 Thus, in the brake manufacturer hypothetical,
because the foreign government holds a controlling interest in
the brake manufacturer, the foreign government will be immune
from suit under the FSIA. However, because the foreign government does not own a controlling interest in the subsidiary
that manufactured the faulty'part, the subsidiary is not immune
from suit.
In further support of its corporate ownership theory, the
Court noted that the same section also refers to a "separate legal person, corporate or otherwise."'19 9 Through its analysis of
the text, the Court concluded that Congress intended the sovereign immunity of a foreign corporation to be contingent upon
formal corporate ownership. 200 If Congress had intended the
statute to refer to ownership in a fashion other than formal corporate ownership, Congress was capable of doing so. 20 1 Thus, a

foreign government must either hold a controlling interest in
the company's stock, or own control of the company in some
20 2
other form.
Second, Justice Kennedy found a corporation to be immune
from suit in U.S. courts only if it were directly owned by a foreign government. 20 3 This is consistent with elementary principles of corporate law, which shield corporate investors from liability notwithstanding severe wrongdoing such as commingling
of corporate and personal funds. 204 Justice Kennedy began this
section of his analysis by noting that a corporation and its
shareholders are separate and distinct entities. 205 A shareholder, by virtue of its ownership of shares, does not own the
corporation's assets. 206 Thus, an individual shareholder does

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 1661.
Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1661.
Id. at 1660.
Id. at 1660-61.
Id. at 1661.
Id. at 1661-62.
Id. at 1658-61.
Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1661.
Id. at 1660.
Id.
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not own the subsidiaries of a corporation. 20 7 Accordingly, the
parent does not own, or have legal title to, the subsidiary of its
subsidiary. 20 8 If a foreign corporation is afforded sovereign immunity solely because a foreign government owns a controlling
share of its parent company, the FSIA would, in effect, allow the
courts to pierce the corporate veil, thereby conferring immunity
upon the corporation based solely on the identity of its principal
shareholders (the foreign government). 209 Ordinarily, the corporate veil is pierced only when it is impossible to separate the actions of the corporation from that of the shareholders. 210 For
example, piercing was not warranted in the situation of the
brake manufacturer because there was no intermingling between the corporation and its owners. The business of the corporation did not become the business of the government merely
because the government held an interest in a parent company.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress manifested its intent to deny immunity to corporations which are not directly
owned by a foreign government through the statutory text and a
reliance on the traditional rules of corporate ownership. 2 11
The Court reasoned that the FSIA extends sovereign immunity only to a corporation which is directly owned by a foreign government because the text of the statute does not compel
a conclusion that Congress intended to disregard the traditional
rules of corporate formalities and pierce the corporate veil in
every case where a foreign government holds some interest in a
corporate defendant. 2 12 Thus, the Court held that Israel did not
have direct ownership in either of the Dead Sea Companies, and
therefore the Dead Sea Companies were not afforded sovereign
immunity under the FSIA.213
IV. THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST TEST
The Supreme Court in Dole mended the split among the circuits over the meaning of the FSIA. The Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit opinion and held that only a corporation which is
directly owned by a foreign government may be granted immu-

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1660.
Id.
Id. at 1661.
Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1660-61.
Id.
Id. at 1660.
Id.
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nity under the FSIA. 214 Although the holding in Dole created a
bright-line rule mandating who may be granted immunity under
the FSIA, it did not address Congress' original concern in enacting the statute. Although Congress was concerned with establishing uniformity in the granting of immunity, the underlying
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity was to promote amicable
foreign relations. 215 The recent Supreme Court decision advances only one of these goals. Limiting immunity to a corporation that is directly owned by a foreign government establishes a
bright-line rule that produces uniformity in decisions to confer
immunity upon a foreign sovereign. However, this bright-line
rule fails to address Congress' original purpose, which was to
promote successful foreign relations. Thus, Congress should legislatively override Dole and create a new rule following Judge
Kaplan's "beneficial interest" test.
In dicta, Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York
suggested that the Act may be read "as bringing second- and
lower-tier subsidiaries of a foreign nation within the definition
of 'foreign state' provided that the foreign government benefi2 16
cially owns a majority of the shares of the entity in question."
For example, a company that is 51% owned by a foreign nation
may own 51% of another company. 21 7 The foreign nation would
beneficially own only 26% of the second-tier subsidiary. 218 Thus,
the FSIA would not apply to the second tier. However, there
may be occasions where a foreign nation may beneficially own
an "nth"-tier subsidiary. That tier would then be allowed to remove to federal court under the FSIA in the event it is sued by a
domestic (U.S.) plaintiff.
Consider the hypothetical example of the train accident at
the beginning of this Article. Assume that the foreign government owned 75% of the shares of the company which owned 51%
of the shares of the brake manufacturer. The foreign government, in this case, would only hold a 38% beneficial interest in
the brake manufacturer. 2 9 Therefore, according to the beneficial interest test, the foreign government does not hold a majority beneficial interest in the brake manufacturer. Because the

214.
215.
216.
2001).
217.
218.
219.

Id.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y.
Id.
Id.
0.75 x 0.51 = 0.3825 or 38%.
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foreign government does not hold more than a 50% beneficial interest, the brake manufacturer is not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, and cannot claim immunity under
the FSIA.
The "beneficial interest" approach advanced by Judge Kaplan in Musopole is the best test to use in determining whether
an "nth"-tier subsidiary of a foreign government may benefit
from the immunity extended under the FSIA for four reasons.
First, this approach is the most consistent with the statutory
language and legislative intent of the FSIA. Second, this approach will alleviate the Ninth Circuit's concern that an endless
chain of foreign corporations would be granted immunity because their government had some minute ownership interest in
the corporation. Third, allowing courts to determine the beneficial interest that a foreign government holds in a corporation
will create a predictable standard which domestic plaintiffs can
rely upon when deciding whether to file suit against the corporation. Fourth, the "beneficial interest" approach is a compromise between the decisions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.
A. CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE
INTENT.

First, Congress should codify the beneficial interest test because it is most consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent of the FSIA. When drafting the FSIA, Congress
endeavored to create a bright-line rule.220

Additionally, Con-

gress did not intend to extend immunity to defendants where
the foreign government did not have a substantial interest in
the outcome of litigation. 2 21 Accordingly, Congress drafted language that conferred immunity upon a "foreign state."222 Con-

gress defined "foreign state" as including a political subdivision
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 223 Because
the language of the Act can be construed to confer immunity on
a lower-tiered subsidiary of a foreign government-owned corporation, it is important to note that Congress did not intend to
extend immunity to an endless line of subsidiaries. 224

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
Id.
See supranotes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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The Dole decision, on the other hand, limits immunity to a
225
company that is directly owned by the foreign government.
Dole does not contemplate the possibility that a foreign government may hold a substantial interest in a lower-tier subsidiary
of a corporation. Thus, Dole risks denying immunity to a foreign
government-owned corporation where the government has a
substantial interest in the outcome of litigation merely because
the government does not directly own the corporation. For this
reason, the beneficial interest approach is the best approach because it complies with Congress' intent to limit immunity while
still affording immunity to those companies where the foreign
government holds a substantial interest in the prosperity of the
company.
B. PROMOTES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The second reason why Congress should legislatively overrule Dole and codify the beneficial interest test is because it
remedies the concern advanced by the Ninth Circuit that a
broad interpretation of the FSIA would grant immunity to an
endless chain of corporations merely because, somewhere in the
line of ownership, a foreign government owned over 50% of its
226
shares.
The beneficial interest test alleviates this problem by ensuring that immunity is extended, not only to a company that is directly owned by a foreign government, but also when a foreign
government holds a substantial beneficial interest in that company. This is consistent with Congressional intent because
Congress is not concerned with litigation the outcome of which
would not affect U.S. foreign policy with the foreign defendant's
nation. A nation that only holds a small beneficial interest in a
company is not likely to be as interested in the outcome of litigation as the foreign government that owns a large beneficial interest or directly owns the company
C. PROVIDES A BRIGHT-LINE RULE

The third reason why Congress should legislatively overrule
Dole and codify the beneficial interest test is because it provides
a bright-line rule that allows the courts to determine whether a
foreign defendant corporation should be granted immunity from
225.
226.

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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suit in U.S. courts. By granting immunity only when a foreign
government beneficially owns a substantial interest in that
company, courts achieve a uniform standard for determining
immunity for "foreign states."
D. COMPROMISE BETWEEN NINTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS
The beneficial interest test provides a compromise between
the Seventh and Ninth circuits. It advances the policy goals of
limiting immunity whild making sure domestic lawsuits do not
jeopardize foreign policy. Domestic plaintiffs may rely on this
standard when deciding whether to file suit against foreign corporate defendants. This approach prevents the extension of
immunity to an endless line of corporations, and therefore alleviates the concerns of the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, the beneficial interest test is consistent with the Seventh Circuit approach because it allows successive tiering instead of limiting
immunity to the first tier.
CONCLUSION
Congress intended the FSIA to grant federal subject matter
jurisdiction to foreign states so that decisions regarding those
states would be somewhat uniform. Uniformity in the treatment of foreign states within the federal court system would
help advance the Executive Branch's ability to conduct successful foreign policy. 227 The meaning of § 1603(a)-(b) of the FSIA
has recently become a subject of hot debate. The Ninth Circuit
led the way in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods when it refused to extend federal subject matter jurisdiction to the second-tier subsidiary of a government-owned corporation. 228 In 1996, one year
later, the Seventh Circuit advanced a literal interpretation of
the act when it allowed successive tiering of a corporation for
purposes of extending federal subject matter jurisdiction. 22 9 Recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have joined the Seventh in
allowing successive tiering. Thus, the trend seems to be moving
toward a broad definition of "agency or instrumentality" as
found in the majority opinions which allow successive tiering.

227. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932 (7th Cir. 1996).
228. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459.
229. Air Crash DisasterNear Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 932.
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The Supreme Court ruled on the issue in its 2003 decision
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.230 Justice Kennedy wrote that the
FSIA grants immunity to a corporate defendant that is directly
owned by a foreign government. 23 1 The Court emphasized that
Congress focused on corporate ownership when it drafted the
FSIA.232 Because a corporate shareholder has an ownership in-

terest only in the corporation for which it holds shares, and not
the corporation's subsidiary, bestowing immunity upon a sub23 3
sidiary amounts to piercing the corporate veil.

The Southern District of New York proposed a solution, in
dicta, which is a better approach than that espoused by the Supreme Court in Dole. 234 Musopole implied that when determin-

ing whether an entity is an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state it is helpful to determine the beneficial interest held
by the government in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of
the FSIA, which is to insure that "foreign states" receive uniform treatment by federal courts, thus ensuring consistency in
U.S. foreign policy. 235 This interpretation is not only a fair com-

promise between the strict and broad interpretations advanced
by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits respectively, but alleviates
the risk produced by Dole of creating inconsistent foreign policy.
Dole effectively creates the bright-line rule sought by Congress
to produce uniformity in decisions to confer sovereign immunity.
However, Dole does not address Congress' ultimate concern,
which was a rule that would aid the Executive Branch in conducting successful foreign policy by not subjecting foreign government-owned corporations to litigation in U.S. courts, or at
least to produce safeguards against biased jury trials. Instead,
Dole limits immunity to those corporations that are directly
owned by a foreign government, while denying immunity to all
other corporations where the foreign government has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation. The "beneficial interest" test on the other hand, grants immunity to all corporations
that are owned by a foreign government where the foreign government has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation.
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